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INTRODUCTION
In the mid-1990s, insurance discrimination against victims of domestic
violence first attracted national media and political attention.1 Despite this
scrutiny, many states still permit insurers to consider whether someone has
been a victim of domestic violence when making access, coverage, and
insurance rating determinations.2 This discrimination is often based on
insurers’ incorrect and offensive assertion that domestic violence victims
voluntarily choose to engage in high-risk behavior.3 Such victim-blaming
ignores the fact that domestic violence is a crime and re-victimizes
individuals seeking insurance protections for themselves and their children.4
Insurance discrimination denies help to victims seeking to rebuild their lives
and could mean the difference between a victim successfully escaping her
abuser or continuing to suffer in silence.5
Parts I and II of this paper will examine the prevalence and costs of
domestic violence and explore how insurance discrimination against victims
of domestic violence occurs. Part III will outline and respond to the
insurance industry’s arguments in favor of using domestic violence as a
factor in insurance classification, including voluntariness, actuarial fairness,
1. Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actually Fair? A
Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355, 355-57
(1997).
2. See NANCY DURBOROW ET AL., FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND,
COMPENDIUM OF STATE STATUTES AND POLICIES ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND HEALTH
CARE
4
(2010),
available
at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/fysb/state_compendium.pdf
(summarizing
state statutes regarding insurance discrimination against victims of domestic violence in
all lines of insurance).
3. One insurance industry advocate stated that “insuring a victim of domestic
violence would be akin to covering a smoker who doesn’t stop smoking.” Hearing on
the Healthcare Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence Reform Act Before the Comm.
on Pub. Servs. & Consumer Affairs, 2010 Leg., 18th Council 2 (D.C. 2010) [hereinafter
Hearing on Healthcare Justice] (statement of Rebecca O’Connor, Policy Director, DC
Coalition Against Domestic Violence) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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moral hazard, and adverse selection. Part IV will provide an overview of the
current state and federal regulations on this issue. Part V will conclude by
proposing four legislative reforms to state laws that will better protect
victims of domestic violence from insurance discrimination.
I. PREVALENCE AND COST OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Domestic violence6 is a widespread problem that has substantial costs—
both financial and emotional—on individuals and society at large. One in
four women7 will experience domestic violence at some point in her life,8
and, every year, approximately 1.3 million women are physically assaulted
by an intimate partner.9 In the United States, nearly 5.3 million domestic
violence victimizations occur each year, resulting in nearly 2 million injuries
and 1,300 deaths.10 Of those injuries, over 555,000 require medical
attention, and more than 145,000 are serious enough to warrant
hospitalization.11 In addition to physical injury, domestic violence results in
over 18.5 million mental health care visits every year.12
The prevalence of domestic violence exacts financial costs on victims. A
report in the American Journal of Preventative Medicine found that women
with a history of domestic violence had significantly higher health care
utilization and costs, which continued long after the domestic violence
ended.13 Compared to women with no history of abuse, domestic violence

6. For the purpose of this paper, domestic violence is “the willful intimidation,
physical assault, battery, sexual assault, and/or other abusive behavior perpetrated by an
intimate partner against another.” NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
FACTS
1
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ncadv.org/files/DomesticViolenceFactSheet(National).pdf .
7. For convenience and consistency, this paper will use female pronouns when
referring to victims of domestic violence, as eighty five percent of domestic violence
victims are women. See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE
PARTNER
VIOLENCE,
1993-2001,
at
1
(2003),
available
at
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf. However, this paper recognizes that men can
be victims of domestic violence, and when they are, should also be protected against
insurance discrimination.
8. NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 6, at 1.
9. JULIE L. GERBERDING ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2003),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ipvbook-a.pdf.
10. Id. at 19 (describing the prevalence of domestic violence among women ages
eighteen and older).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Frederick P. Rivara et al., Healthcare Utilization and Costs for Women with
a History of Intimate Partner Violence, 32 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 89, 92-93 (2007),

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015

3

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 2

416

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 23:3

victims were more likely to use mental health services, substance abuse
services, hospital outpatient visits, emergency department visits, and acute
inpatient care during and after their domestic abuse.14 After adjusting for
age, education, and the presence of major unrelated illnesses, the report
found that annual health care costs were nineteen percent higher for women
with a history of domestic violence than for women without a history of
domestic violence.15 This difference in costs amounts to $439 per year per
woman with a history of domestic violence.16 It should come as no surprise,
therefore, that the annual health care costs for domestic violence—including
medical and mental health services—are estimated to total almost $4.1
billion.17
II. HOW INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION OCCURS
Insurance companies detect domestic violence in three primary ways.
First, insurance companies require applicants to grant them access to their
medical records, which often contain information about past abuse.18 In fact,
the increased awareness of and responsiveness to domestic violence injuries
among medical professionals in recent years has made medical records richer
and more reliable sources for insurance companies to obtain such
information.19 Second, insurance companies can share information about
applicants’ risk factors—both medical and non-medical—through databases
such as Equifax and the Medical Information Bureau.20 Insurance companies

available at http://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797(06)00423-5/fulltext.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 93.
16. Id.
17. See GERBERDING ET AL., supra note 9, at 30. Of course, the societal costs of
domestic violence extend far beyond health care utilization and include, for example, the
costs related to law enforcement, temporary shelters, foster care, and lost productivity.
See Ellen J. Morrison, Note, Insurance Discrimination Against Battered Women:
Proposed Legislative Protections, 72 IND. L.J. 259, 262-65 (1996); see also Elizabeth A.
Hoskins, South Carolina Women Are Not Preexisting Conditions, 63 S.C. L. REV. 949,
957-59 (2012).
18. Sheri A. Mullikin, Note, A Cost Analysis Approach to Determining the
Reasonableness of Using Domestic Violence as an Insurance Classification, 25 J. LEGIS.
195, 198-99 (1999).
19. Morrison, supra note 17, at 267.
20. See TERRY FROMSON & NANCY DURBOROW, PA. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE & THE WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT, INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
VICTIMS
OF
DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE
1
(1998),
available
at
http://www.womenslawproject.org/brochures/Insurance_discrimDV.pdf. See generally
Gina Kolata, When Patients’ Records Are Commodities for Sale, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15,
1995), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/11/15/science/when-patients-records-
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that subscribe to these databases are required to report client risk factors and
entitled to access risk-related information on applicants or those already
insured.21 Finally, insurers can discover a history of domestic violence by
accessing police reports, court documents, and credit reports that often
contain information about protective orders.22
Insurers can use this information in several ways, all of which penalize
victims of domestic violence. During the underwriting process, insurers may
consider a history of domestic violence when determining whether to offer
insurance to an individual and, if so, at what price.23 Insurers can cancel
coverage for existing customers24 and deny coverage for abuse-related
conditions and claims.25 Such actions by insurance companies may revictimize victims of abuse,26 prevent victims from obtaining healthcare for
themselves and their families,27 incentivize victims to remain in abusive
relationships to maintain coverage,28 and discourage victims from seeking
necessary medical treatment, counseling, legal intervention, and other
assistance.29
III. COUNTERARGUMENT: RATIONALE FOR INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS
AND USE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DATA SPECIFICALLY
Insurers use insurance classifications based in part on the principle of
“actuarial fairness.”30 Insurance premiums are actuarially fair if each insured
are-commodities-for-sale.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (explaining that property and
casualty insurers also have databases on claims histories).
21. See FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 1.
22. See Mullikin, supra note 18, at 199.
23. See FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 1. For examples of domestic
violence victims being denied health, disability, life, property and casualty, and
automobile insurance; see id. at 3-7.
24. See Mullikin, supra note 18, at 197; see also FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra
note 20, at 4-5 (listing examples of insurers cancelling the policies of domestic violence
victims).
25. FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 2 (stating that some insurers deny
abuse-related claims on the basis that exclusions exist in the insurance policy for
intentional acts).
26. See Fern Shen, For the Battered Spouse, Insurers’ Bias Worsens Pain, WASH.
POST, Mar. 9, 1995, at A1. ‘
27. See FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 1.
28. See Morrison, supra note 17, at 268; see also Shen, supra note 26, at A16
(quoting Lynne Gold-Bilkin, head of the ABA’s Family Law Section) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (“If the batterer is the source of insurance for [the victim] and her child,
and if she can’t get insurance herself, she won’t risk leaving.”).
29. See FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 1.
30. TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES,
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pays a price for coverage that is equivalent to the risk he or she poses of
suffering a loss and drawing from the insurance pool, given the information
available.31 To an insurer, therefore, evidence of domestic violence is simply
information that—like an individual’s medical history, age, gender,
occupation, lifestyle, etc.—helps the insurer to predict that individual’s risk
and determine whether, and at what price, to provide insurance.32 Insurance
companies are private businesses that must remain solvent. Thus, the
insurance industry would likely argue that restricting an insurer’s ability to
consider available and relevant information decreases its ability to make
more accurate predictions of risk, collect adequate premiums, and ensure
solvency.33
The insurance industry’s unwillingness to provide coverage for domestic
violence victims rests primarily on two justifications: (1) the voluntariness
of the behavior and (2) the high-risk levels it carries.34 Some insurers
maintain that insurance discrimination against victims of domestic violence
is appropriate because battered women choose to stay in abusive
environments.35 For example, a State Farm official repeatedly stated that
insuring a battered woman is like insuring a diabetic who refuses to take
insulin.36 Others in the insurance industry have claimed that “a victim of
domestic violence makes a voluntary lifestyle choice, similar to skydiving or
riding a motorcycle, and liken battering to a career choice, such as washing
skyscraper windows, for which an insurance company should not be
responsible.”““37
Analogizing domestic violence to optional and dangerous activities like
skydiving illustrates insurers’ second justification for using domestic
violence as an insurance classification: that victims of domestic violence are
greater risks. As one commentator noted, “it is extremely disingenuous to
suggest that insurers are practicing unfair discrimination when they respond

MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 636 (3d ed. 2013).
31. See id.; see also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 84 (1986).
32. Mary Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54
U. KAN. L. REV. 73, 102-03 (2005).
33. See Mullikin, supra note 18, at 221-22.
34. See Morrison, supra note 17, at 272-74. Some insurers also argue that insuring
victims incentivizes batterers to kill in order to collect on life insurance policies. They
suggest that denying coverage protects victims from “being murdered by their
abusers.”““ Id. at 274.
35. See Mullikin, supra note 18, at 216.
36. Hellman, supra note 1, at 361. As one insurance executive said, “[A battered
woman] has a choice to move on . . . . . . . .We’re a business, not a social welfare
organization.” Shen, supra note 26, at A16.
37. FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 7.
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to the higher costs associated with domestic violence by raising rates or
denying coverage. That is, after all, how insurers treat all high-risk
insureds.”38 Underlying the concern about high-risk behavior is the fear of
insolvency. One insurance executive reasoned that, “[w]hether it’s battering
or breast cancer or HIV or a sky diver or a person recovering from breast
cancer, if we fail to take these things into account, it could lead us into
bankruptcy.”39
In reality, neither of these theories—that victims choose to be battered or
that victims present greater risks—support the use of domestic violence as
an insurance classification. “Domestic violence is a crime — not a lifestyle,
career, or choice.”40 The idea that victims of domestic violence choose to
remain in abusive relationships perpetuates dangerous stereotypes about
domestic violence victims and ignores the multitude of significant obstacles
that victims face when trying to leave their abusers.41 Many victims lack the
economic resources necessary to leave an abusive partner.42 Often times,
leaving an abuser means leaving a well-established life, including a job and
a regular paycheck.43 Even if a victim can leave her abuser, finding new
housing can be challenging and prohibitively expensive.44 Battered
women’s shelters regularly turn away women and children due to limited
space.45 Victims also justifiably fear retaliatory attacks by their abusers if
they leave.46
In terms of actuarial fairness, there is no conclusive evidence that a history
of domestic violence is a risk factor that changes the overall cost of

38. Crossley, supra note 32, at 103 n.150 (quoting Robert Detlefsen, Abusing
Discrimination,
MONTHLY
PLANET
(Aug.
1,
1997),
http://www.cei.org/gencon005,01239.cfm).
39. Shen, supra note 26, at A16 (quoting David McMahon, vice president of First
Colony Life Insurance Co.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 7.
41. See Morrison, supra note 17, at 262-63 (noting that there are often
insurmountable barriers that prevent abuse victims from escaping their violent
surroundings).
42. FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 7.
43. Morrison, supra note 17, at 262.
44. Id. at 262-63; FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 7.
45. Morrison, supra note 17, at 262. Even if a victim can secure a bed in a shelter,
most shelters only offer temporary housing—usually up to thirty days—which is a very
short timeframe to create a new life. FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 7.
46. Morrison, supra note 17, at 263.
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insurance.47 However, the costs related to domestic violence48 and the
homicide rates of domestic violence victims49 could justifiably lead an
insurer to assume that domestic violence victims are greater insurance risks.
After State Farm reversed its policy of discriminating against victims of
domestic violence, a company spokesperson admitted that the company had
no evidentiary basis for refusing to insure victims of abuse; rather, “[w]e had
no statistics at all to tell us that there was an increased risk . . . . . . .It was
just sort of a logical conclusion.”50 Additionally, insurance companies’ fear
of insolvency can be refuted through examples of insurance companies that
do not use domestic violence as a classification; such companies, which have
grown in number since the 1990s, are still profitable and able to offer
affordable products without discriminating against victims of abuse.51
Insurers may also use domestic violence victimization as an insurance
classification to prevent adverse selection and moral hazard, theoretical
concepts about consumer behaviors that negatively impact insurance
providers. Adverse selection refers to “the [theoretical] tendency for highrisk people to be more interested in insurance than low-risk people are.”52
The theoretical result of adverse selection is that the average risk level of the
individuals who purchase insurance will be higher than the average risk level
of the general population.53 In the context of domestic violence, adverse
selection would lead domestic violence victims, assuming they are higher
risks, to purchase insurance at a greater level than the average person.
However, there is little research on adverse selection in the domestic
violence context,54 and the general nature of batterers (irrational and hard to
predict) and the effects of the Battered Women’s Syndrome (creating a cycle
of “learned helplessness” among victims) arguably cast some doubt on the
47. FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 7; Morrison, supra note 17, at 27374; Mullikin, supra note 18, at 214-16.
48. See Rivara et al., supra note 13 (stating that women who have suffered domestic
abuse spend an additional $439 per year on health care compared to women who have
not been victims of domestic violence).
49. See Morrison, supra note 17, at 263.
50. See Monica C. Fountain, Insurance Companies Hit Battered Women Too, CHI.
TRIB.
(June
4,
1995)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1995-06-04/features/9506040136_1_domesticviolence-battered-domestic-abuse. The spokesperson added, “[w]e altered our position
quickly. We decided we just couldn’t be a part of that.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
51. See Morrison, supra note 17, at 273.
52. See BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 30, at 12.
53. Id.
54. Of all the domestic violence-related sources consulted for this paper, only one
source even used the term “adverse selection.” See Hellman, supra note 1, at 396.
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strength of the argument.
Moral hazard is “the theoretical tendency for insurance to reduce
incentives (1) to protect against loss or (2) to minimize the cost of a loss.”55
In the context of domestic violence, moral hazard could entail a victim
making herself more likely to be abused because she knows that she has
insurance to cover the costs associated with her injuries, damage to property,
etc. Yet, due to the nature of domestic violence, this is unlikely to occur. A
victim is not going to incite her batterer to break her arm simply because she
knows her health insurance will pay for the cast.56 Related to moral hazard
is the argument that providing life insurance to victims of domestic violence
incentivizes batterers to murder to collect on the policy.57 Advocates for
victims of domestic violence would respond that this argument
misunderstands the nature of domestic violence and why batterers abuse
their victims.58 As one lawyer quipped, “[B]attering is not something people
do for money . . . . . . . The immediate cause of battering may be that she
burned the toast, and the general issue is dominance. But it doesn’t happen
because the batterer went and checked the insurance policy.”59 Nevertheless,
if insurers remain concerned about this potential practice, states could follow
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners model law prohibiting
discrimination in life insurance, which addresses this possible incentive.60
IV. FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS PROHIBITING INSURANCE
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
a. Evolution of Federal and State Laws
Until the early to mid-1990s, insurance companies regularly discriminated
against victims of domestic violence in all lines of insurance.61 In 1994,

55. See BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 30, at 6.
56. Id. Additionally, such an argument falsely—and somewhat offensively—

presupposes that victims are responsible for their abuse and could have taken steps to
minimize it.
57. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 17, at 274.
58. See id.
59. Shen, supra note 26, at A16 (quoting Susan Kraham, lawyer with the Legal
Defense and Education Fund of the National Organization for Women) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
60. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
SUBJECTS OF ABUSE IN LIFE INSURANCE MODEL ACT 4 (1999) [hereinafter LIFE
INSURANCE MODEL ACT], available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-896.pdf.
61. Brief for Women’s Law Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at
7, Lynn v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 70 A.3d 814 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (No. 1458 WDA
2012), 2012 WL 9245402, at *7.
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Congressman Charles Schumer called attention to this discriminatory
practice when, as a member of the House Judiciary Committee, he surveyed
sixteen of the nation’s largest insurance companies.62 He determined that
eight considered a history of domestic violence in making decisions
regarding coverage and premiums.63
Congressman Schumer’s
discovery,and the fact that no law prohibited such discrimination,64
generated national attention and outrage.65 Domestic violence advocates,
legislators, and state insurance regulators responded by drafting, and in some
cases enacting, legislation prohibiting the use of domestic violence as an
insurance classification.66 Some insurers also voluntarily modified their
practices. 67
Forty-two states have passed laws prohibiting at least some kinds of
insurance discrimination against domestic violence victims since 1994.68
State legislatures and insurance departments were aided by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), which began studying the
effects of insurance discrimination against domestic violence victims in
1995.69 The NAIC created four model laws prohibiting discrimination
against victims of domestic violence in life, health, disability, and property
and casualty insurance.70 Each model law defines essential terms and
specifies prohibited actions, recommends developing protocols for insurance
company employees to follow to protect victims’ safety and privacy, and
addresses enforcement.71 Although the NAIC cannot compel states to adopt
the model legislation, state legislatures and insurance companies often take
62.
63.
64.
65.

See Hoskins, supra note 17, at 950-51.
Id.
DURBOROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.
See Brief for Women’s Law Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant,
supra note 61, at 10.
66. DURBOROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.
67. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 356.
68. See Hearing on Healthcare Justice, supra note 3, at 3. Seven states—Idaho,
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming—
and the District of Columbia do not prohibit this practice. Id.
69. See Morrison, supra note 17, at 281-82.
70. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
SUBJECTS OF ABUSE IN HEALTH BENEFIT PLANS MODEL ACT 895-3 (1999), available at
http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-895.pdf; LIFE INSURANCE MODEL ACT, supra note
60; NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SUBJECTS OF
ABUSE IN DISABILITY INCOME INSURANCE MODEL ACT (1999), available at
http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-897.pdf; NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, UNFAIR
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SUBJECTS OF ABUSE IN PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE
(1999), available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/MDL-898.pdf.
71. DURBOROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 4-5.
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note of NAIC’s positions and may conform their policies, statutes, and
behavior accordingly.72
After 1994, members of Congress also attempted to prohibit
discrimination against domestic violence victims in some or all lines of
insurance; however, none of the comprehensive proposed legislation was
enacted.73 In the health insurance context, some protections for victims have
been enacted. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA)74 prohibits the use of domestic violence as a preexisting
condition in underwriting decisions and forbids companies from denying
group health insurance to victims of domestic violence.75 However,
HIPAA’s protections only extend to health insurance.76 More recently, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)77 implemented health
insurance reforms that generally prohibit discrimination in access and
underwriting.78 Specifically, the ACA requires insurance companies to
guarantee availability of coverage and prohibits exclusions based on
preexisting conditions, which has the effect of preventing insurance
discrimination against domestic violence victims.79 Again, however, these
protections against discrimination only apply in health insurance.80
Although these federal statutes constitute important progress towards
eliminating insurance discrimination against victims of domestic violence,
they do not provide sufficient protection for two primary reasons.81 First, of
course, HIPAA and the ACA only apply to health insurance, whereas
discrimination against victims of domestic violence occurs in all lines of
insurance.82 Second, although some advocates contend that victims would

72. See Morrison, supra note 17, at 283.
73. See Mullikin, supra note 18, at 211.
74. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections

of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
75. See Mullikin, supra note 18, at 211-12.
76. DURBOROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.
77. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
25 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
78. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201(4), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4.
79. See id; see also Hearing on Healthcare Justice, supra note 3, at 3.
80. See DURBOROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 5. For a discussion of how the ACA
should be addressed in the legislative reform this paper proposes, see infra Part IV(d).
81. See Hearing on Healthcare Justice, supra note 3, at 4 (“While the passage of
federal legislation is a crucial step towards eradicating these discriminatory practices, it
does not relieve states from a responsibility to enact the strongest and most
comprehensive protections available for victims.”).
82. See FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 2.
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be better served by a federal law,83 “[t]he insurance industry has long been
recognized as a field traditionally regulated by the states rather than the
federal government.”84
b. Survey of State Laws
Current state laws regarding insurance discrimination—where they exist
at all—vary tremendously in their language, strength, and coverage of
different lines of insurance.85 The National Women’s Law Center’s report
card categorizes states into four categories based on which lines of insurance
their laws cover.86 States that prohibit discrimination in all four lines of
insurance (health, life, disability, and property/casualty) “meet policy”;
states that do so in three lines of insurance are considered to have a “limited
policy”; states that cover only one or two lines have a “weak policy”; and
states with no protections have “no policy.”87 According to the report, 24
states “meet policy,” 6 states have a “limited policy,” 14 states have a “weak
policy,” and 7 states have “no policy.”88
Professor Deborah Hellman illustrates the tremendous diversity in the
strength and language of state laws and legislative proposals by categorizing
them into five types of bills, three of which are particularly illustrative in the
context of this paper.89 The weakest bills only prohibit irrational
discrimination against victims of domestic violence; that is, the use of
domestic violence victimization as a classification is only prohibited where
it is not actuarially sound.90 A New York statute, for example, states that
insurers may not deny or limit coverage “solely because a person is or has
been a victim of domestic violence.”91 An insurer may, however, limit or
deny coverage “because abuse victims are at higher risk than average
insureds (i.e., both because the person is an abuse victim and because abuse

83. DURBOROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 5 (arguing that a federal law covering all
lines of insurance would provide uniformity of protection and better address the fact that
victims of domestic violence often cross state lines when leaving their abusers).
84. See Hearing on Healthcare Justice, supra note 3, at 4.
85. See Crossley, supra note 32, at 103. For a detailed summary of every state’s
insurance anti-discrimination law(s) (if applicable), see DURBOROW ET AL., supra note
2, at 9-68.
86. See Health Care Report Card: Domestic Violence in Insurance, NAT’L WOMEN’S
L. CENTER, http://hrc.nwlc.org/policy-indicators/domestic-violence-insurance (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 404-10.
90. Id. at 404.
91. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 2612 (McKinney 1996) (emphasis added).
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victims have bad claim histories).”92 Although these weak laws may have
expressive significance, they do not provide any additional protection
beyond state insurance laws, which already prohibit rates that are
“[e]xcessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”93
The most common type of law forbids the use of domestic violence
victimization as a classification, but allows the adverse treatment of
individuals an insurer believes are likely to become victims, so long as they
are identified another way.94 Because most domestic violence victims are
identified through their records, which indicate repeated injuries and/or
emergency room visits, an insurer could discriminate against victims using
their medical records, rather than the prohibited domestic violence victim
classification, and still comply with the law.95 While this type of law may
protect victims in name, it does little to prevent discrimination in practice.
Stronger laws prohibit insurers from charging more or denying coverage
because of the likelihood that a victim will be attacked again by her abuser.96
In many ways, this type of legislation closes the loophole left open by the
previous category of laws: while the previous type of law forbids the use of
domestic violence victimization as a classifier but allows insurers to use
other means—like medical records—to identify insureds as victims, this
stronger type of legislation forbids insurers from trying to identify victims of
domestic violence at all.97 These types of laws—which Professor Hellman
calls “target laws”— prevent insurers from using any classifications,
including prior claims history, to predict future risk of claims resulting from
domestic violence.98

92. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 404.
93. See ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING

INSURANCE LAW 93 (4th ed. 2007) (emphasis added).
94. Hellman, supra note 1, at 405.
95. Id. For example, a law in Indiana states that an insurer may not deny or limit
coverage “because the individual has been, is, or has the potential to be a victim of
abuse,” but does not prohibit an insurer from “adjusting premiums on the basis that the
individual has a physical or mental condition or claims history.” IND. CODE § 27-8-24.36 (2014); see also Hellman, supra note 1, at 405 n. 131.
96. Hellman, supra note 1, at 406.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 407. An example of target-based legislation is a 1995 proposed federal bill
that prohibited insurers from denying or cancelling an individual’s health insurance or
varying or increasing premiums “on the basis that the individual or family member is,
has been, or may been the subject of abuse, has had prior injuries that resulted from
abuse, or seeks, has sought, or should have sought medical or psychological treatment
for protection against abuse, or shelter from abuse.” Id. at 406-07 (citing H.R. 1201,
104th Cong. (1995)). Note that, in order to consciously not use domestic violence
victimization as an insurance classification, insurers must actually make a determination
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V. INSURANCE CLASSIFICATIONS BASED ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARE
UNFAIR AND SOCIALLY UNDESIRABLE
a. Insurance Discrimination Further Endangers the Safety of Victims and
Their Children
Insurance discrimination can have devastating effects on domestic
violence victims and their children.99 First, the risk of losing insurance
coverage may discourage victims from seeking the medical treatment or
legal assistance that they need. This chilling effect may serve to keep
victims, and by extension their children, at the hands of their batterers
longer.100 Victims that do not receive medical or legal assistance are less
likely to have the support necessary to successfully leave their batterers. 101
Even if a victim otherwise has the strength and courage to leave her batterer,
a lack of insurance may pose severe economic hardships that ultimately
persuade her to stay in the relationship. As one advocacy group noted, “[f]or
a battered victim seeking to leave the batterer, access to insurance and the
life necessities associated with insurance may mean the difference between
leaving or remaining trapped in the abusive situation.”102 Children are often
further harmed when victims remain in abusive relationships both through
witnessing abuse and from being subjected to abuse themselves.103
According to experts, children who witness or suffer from abuse are more
likely to become abusers or victims as adults, meaning that these barriers to
leaving can have long-term consequences on crime and public safety.104
Even if a victim can overcome these obstacles and successfully leave her
that an insured is a victim of domestic violence. A critical corollary of these “target
laws,” therefore, is a requirement that insurers keep this determination confidential.
99. Brief for Women’s Law Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant,
supra note 61, at 10.
100. Hearing on Healthcare Justice, supra note 3, at 5.
101. Mullikin, supra note 18, at 224-25; see also Jeannette Vorell, Insurers Shouldn’t
Hurt Victims Again, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, May 23, 1997, at B10 (describing the
experience of a victim who stated that the availability of insurance coverage, despite her
history of domestic violence, allowed her to seek counseling, which was instrumental in
her decision to leave and divorce her abusive husband).
102. Brief for Women’s Law Project et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant,
supra note 61, at 10.
103. Mullikin, supra note 18, at 225.
104. Id. (citing 141 CONG. REC. H10720-01, H10723 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995)
(statement of Ms. Waters and Ms. Jackson-Lee) (stating that research shows that children
who witness abuse at home are more likely to become abusers or victims when they
become adults). Additionally, research shows that children who witness abuse are at a
“higher risk for substance abuse, depression, low self-esteem, poor impulse control, and
sexual acting out.” Id.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss3/2

14

Wilson: Stop Re-Victimizing the Victims: A Call For Stronger State Laws P

2015]

STOP RE-VICTIMIZING THE VICTIMS

427

abuser, not having insurance can negatively impact her ability to begin a
fruitful and stable life on her own. “Not being able to obtain health,
automobile, or homeowners insurance because of domestic violence means
a mother can’t afford to take her kids to the doctor, cannnot provide for her
kids in the event of her disability or death, cannot own a car, or own or even
rent a home—all critical factors in establishing a life free of violence.”105
b. Domestic Violence is a Crime, Not a Choice
Insurance discrimination based on domestic violence victimization
unfairly pegs victims as participants in risky lifestyle rather than victims of
crimes. Not only are victims “subjected to the uncontrollable, criminal acts
of a third party,”106 but the nature of abusive relationships often make it
extraordinarily hard for a victim to leave.107 In addition to the economic
factors that constrain victims, victims realistically fear that their batterers
will pursue them and continue—or even escalate—the abuse.108 Abuse often
continues after a victim separates from her abuser, and data indicates that
domestic violence victims who separate or divorce their partners are more
frequently and more severely battered than those who remain in their
relationships.109 Attempting to leave an abusive relationship can be lethal:
“three of [every] four women killed in the United States are murdered by
current or former partners when the women attempt to leave or have already
left.”110

c. Insurance Discrimination Is Contrary to Community Obligations and
Desires
As previously established, domestic violence is a crime for which victims
are not responsible. Not only are victims subject to violent crimes, but unlike
victims of, say, assault and battery or mugging, economic, social, and
physical security concerns make it extraordinarily difficult for victims to
leave the abusive situation. Some advocates, most notably Professor
Hellman, argue that “the state has a clear and uncontroversial obligation to

105. Health Insurance and Domestic Violence: Hearing on S. 524 Before the S.
Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 104th Cong. 10 (1995) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 524]
(statement of Nancy E. Durborow, Pa. Coal. Against Domestic Violence).
106. Mullikin, supra note 18, at 216.
107. Hearing on S. 524, supra note 105, at 10.
108. Id.
109. Morrison, supra note 17, at 263.
110. Id. at 263 n. 29 (citing Joan Zorza, Women Battering: High Costs and the State
of the Law, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 383, 387 (1994)).
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provide crime protection and to do so on a fair basis.”111 That individuals
become victims of domestic violence, therefore, means that the state has
failed to adequately protect society from these crimes.112 Therefore, “the
community should share the cost the abuse victim faces by virtue of the fact
that she is a poor insurance risk.”113 Professor Hellman’s conclusion
assumes that domestic violence victims are greater insurance risks and
therefore cost more to insure, an assumption with which many academics
and advocates disagree.114 In addition, Professor Hellman refers strictly to
health insurance coverage. Arguably, however, her overall conclusion could
be generalized to apply to victims in all lines of insurance; that is, because
(i) the community has failed to protect victims from domestic violence and
(ii) insurance is critical starting a new safe and stable life, the community
owes it to victims to prohibit insurance discrimination based on their victim
status so that they can successfully rebuild their lives after escaping abuse.
Even if one does not agree that the community is morally obligated to
prohibit insurance discrimination against domestic violence victims because
it failed to provide adequate crime protection, one can recognize that
insurance classifications have expressive significance.115 The kinds of
insurance risk rating we permit versus the kinds of insurance risk rating we
prohibit says something “about what kind of a community we want to be.”116
As Professor Hellman concludes, “the debate about whether the actuarial
fairness principle ought to govern health insurance pricing is a debate about
whether ours is a community that is committed to the provision of aid to
those who are sick and disabled.”117 In the context of domestic violence,
legislation that prohibits insurance discrimination “sends a message of
community solidarity with battered women.”118 Arguably, the strong public
111. Hellman, supra note 1, at 410.
112. Id. This argument for community responsibility is bolstered by the fact that, for

hundreds of years, society has tolerated domestic violence and failed to even recognize
it as a crime. Id.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 17, at 271.
115. See Hellman, supra note 1, at 392-93.
116. Id. at 403.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 392; see also BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 30, at 637 (“The principle of
social solidarity . . . holds that insurance exists for the benefit of the group and therefore
it should be structured to promote the broadest possible risk distribution, an idea that is
consistent with placing limits on insurers’ ability to classify risks. In addition, the
principal of distributional equality suggests that society should seek to eliminate on at
least reduce certain arbitrary differences in opportunities or economics well-being that
exist between individuals, especially where those differences are not the result of
voluntary, informed choices but rather are the result of ‘brute luck.’”).
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outcry against insurance discrimination based on domestic violence
victimization suggests that the nation has indicated what kind of community
it wants to be.
VI. CALL FOR STRONGER STATE LAWS ADDRESSING DISCRIMINATION IN
ALL LINES OF INSURANCE
As previous sections have made clear, state laws fail to uniformly and
comprehensively protect victims of domestic violence against discrimination
by insurers. This section will outline four important features that all state
laws should include in order to better protect victims of domestic violence.
a. State Laws Should Extend Protections to People “Perceived to Be” or
“Who May Be” Victims of Domestic Violence.
To adequately protect all victims, state laws should extend their
protections to individuals who are “perceived to be” victims of domestic
violence. After all, “differential treatment based on perception is at the heart
of discriminatory practices.”119 Laws in Louisiana and Maine currently
contain such language.120 Maine’s statute prohibits discrimination “based on
the fact or perception that a person is, or may become, a victim of domestic
abuse.”121 Similarly, Louisiana defines “abuse status” as “the fact or
perception that a person is, has been, or may be a subject of abuse,
irrespective of whether the person has sustained abuse-related medical
conditions.”122
Relatedly, all states should join the ten jurisdictions that extend
protections to individuals who “may be” victims of domestic violence.123
Including individuals who may be victims of domestic violence recognizes
the reality that “insurers are able to discriminate based on domestic violence
even if an incident of abuse has not yet occurred.”124 One advocacy
organization, the DC Coalition Against Domestic Violence (DCCADV),
gives an example of where this issue might arise: suppose “a person seeking
medical or mental health treatment might tell her doctor details suggesting
that domestic violence is likely to occur.”125 If such individuals face
discrimination based on such a disclosure—a disclosure which could be
necessary to treat and prevent future abuse—they are less likely to seek help
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Hearing on Healthcare Justice, supra note 3, at 6.
Id. at 7.
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24-A, § 2159-B(1) (2014) (emphasis added).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1078(A)(2) (2010) (emphasis added).
See Hearing on Healthcare Justice, supra note 3, at 7 n.15.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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or reveal that information.126
b. State Laws Should Require Confidentiality from Insurers Who Possess
Domestic Violence History.
Fourteen states require insurers who possess information about an
applicant or insured’s status as victim of domestic violence to keep that
information confidential.127 On the federal level, HIPAA restricts a health
plan’s ability to disclose individually identifying information.128 Such laws
“recognize the critical importance of confidentiality to victims of domestic
violence, whose lives and safety often depend on preventing information
about treatment for their abuse from being sent to their batterers.”129
According to the DCCADV, Wisconsin has one of the most comprehensive
statutes regarding confidentiality protections and could be used as a model
law for other states.130 Specifically, state laws should set up protocols for
insurers to keep victims’ abuse history, contact information, and location
confidential. Additionally, since status as a domestic violence victim should
be a prohibited insurance classification, insurers should be prohibited from
sharing an insured or applicant’s domestic violence history through their
databases or otherwise.131
c. State Laws Should Increase the Scope of Prohibited Insurer Conduct.
Thirty four states currently prohibit insurers from using domestic violence
victimization information in the process of making insurance rating
determinations;132 however, all other states should enact this basic protection
against insurance discrimination. Additionally, states should prohibit
insurers from denying claims arising out of domestic violence and from
terminating coverage based on abuse-related claims.133 Often, insurance
companies will determine that abuse-related claims fall within policy
exclusions for intentional acts and therefore deny coverage to victims.134 For
example, if an abuser sets fire to his family’s home in order to harm his

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8 n.17; see WIS. STAT. § 631.95(5). For DCCADV’s model provision
requiring confidentiality, see Hearing on Healthcare Justice, supra note 3, at 8-9.
131. Id.
132. Hearing on Healthcare Justice, supra note 3, at 12 n.27.
133. See FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 2; see also Hearing on Healthcare
Justice, supra note 3, at 12-13 (noting these methods of discrimination by insurers).
134. FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 2.
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spouse, an insurer might deny the claim based on the exclusion for
intentional misconduct to the detriment of the innocent spouse who shares
her abuser’s insurance policy.135 The insurer’s denial of such a claim
“leav[es] the victim without a home or the means to replace it False . . [and]
guarantee[s] the accomplishment of the batterer’s goal of harming the
victim.”136 Ultimately, “these types of discriminatory practices undermine
the purpose of the intentional act exclusion, which is to prohibit the
wrongdoer from benefiting from his own wrongful acts.”137 For this reason,
seventeen states currently prohibit insurers from denying claims arising out
of abuse.138
d. Insurance Discrimination Should Be Prohibited in All Lines of
Insurance, With Special Attention Paid to PPACA and Life Insurance
Concerns.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, victims of domestic violence
should be protected from discrimination in health, life, disability, and
property and casualty insurance.139 Although the ACA’s coverage guarantee
and prohibition of preexisting condition exclusions should serve to protect
victims of domestic violence from discrimination in health insurance,140
compliance with and enforcement of the ACA’s provisions remain to be
seen. Therefore, state insurance departments and advocates for victims of
domestic violence should monitor how forthcoming ACA regulations
address domestic violence victimization and be prepared to push for new
state laws where the ACA’s protections fall short.
Outside of the health insurance realm, states should prohibit insurance
discrimination against victims of domestic violence in all other lines of
insurance. States may encounter the argument that, for adverse selection and
moral hazard reasons,141 life insurance should be treated differently and not
included in state laws prohibiting insurance discrimination based on
domestic violence victimization. This argument certainly has merits and
makes intuitive sense. However, it can be challenged by the fact that thirty-

135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. For real examples of this situation, see id. at 5-7.
Id. at 2.
Hearing on Healthcare Justice, supra note 3, at 11.
Id. at 13 n.29. For example, Delaware’s statute prohibits insurers from
“deny[ing] a claim incurred by an insured as a result of abuse or the potential for abuse.”
Id. at 13 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304(24)(c) (2014)).
139. FROMSON & DURBOROW, supra note 20, at 12.
140. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2705, 43 U.S.C. § 300gg-4
(2013).
141. See, e.g., BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 30, at 6, 12.
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three states currently prohibit discrimination in life insurance based on
domestic violence.142 In addition, the NAIC’s model legislation prohibits
discrimination based on “the applicants or insured’s abuse status” in life
insurance.143 That these states have outlawed life insurance discrimination
against domestic violence victims without significant consequences for
insurance companies supports the argument that other states can, too, and
that any moral hazard and adverse selection concerns are minimal or
nonexistent. However, state insurance departments should undertake
additional research if necessary to ensure that such legislation can be passed
without negative consequences for insurers. These two caveats aside, state
laws should be amended to address and include any lines of insurance they
currently omit.
VII. CONCLUSION
Insurance discrimination against victims of domestic violence raises
several issues that also apply to insurance regulation more broadly: ensuring
the solvency of insurers, the expressive significance of insurance
classifications, insurance regulation as an instrument of social policy, and
the critical role of insurance in starting and maintaining a stable and secure
life. “Within this [private insurance] system,” one commentator observed,
“the desire of the insurance industry to guarantee its fiscal solvency must be
balanced against society’s need to maintain its moral solvency.”144 As this
paper has shown, some states and insurers have successfully prohibited
insurance discrimination against domestic violence victims without causing
insolvency issues. Furthermore, domestic violence is a crime, not a choice.
Insurance discrimination re-victimizes battered women, penalizes them

142. See generally DURBOROW ET AL., supra note 2, at 9-68 (outlining states’
insurance discrimination laws—or lack thereof—and the types of insurance they cover).
143. LIFE INSURANCE MODEL ACT, supra note 60, at 3 (prohibiting discrimination by
insurers—in issuing or renewing policies—on the basis of abuse status). NAIC’s model
law does take measures to address moral hazard concerns. Section 4(F) provides that
“[This Act] does not prohibit a life insurer or insurance professional from declining to
issue a life insurance policy if the applicant or prospective owner of the policy is or would
be designated as a beneficiary of the policy, and if: (1) [t]he applicant or prospective
owner of the policy lacks an insurable interest in the insured; (2) [t]he applicant or
prospective owner of the policy is known, on the basis of medical, police or court records,
to have committed an act of abuse against the proposed insured; or (3) [t]he insured or
prospective insured is the subject of abuse, and that person False . . has objected to the
issuance of the policy on the ground that the policy would be issued to or for the direct
or indirect benefit of the abuser.” Id. at 4.
144. Morrison, supra note 17, at 271 (quoting Benjamin Schatz, The AIDS Insurance
Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1782, 1805 (1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss3/2

20

Wilson: Stop Re-Victimizing the Victims: A Call For Stronger State Laws P

2015]

STOP RE-VICTIMIZING THE VICTIMS

433

instead of their batterers, and denies them access to insurance at a time when
they need it most. States should enact stronger and more comprehensive
laws to prohibit the use of domestic violence victimization as an insurance
classification.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2015

21

